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T HE history of a manufacturer's liability for negligence is a story
of the gradual elimination of the requirement of privity of con-
tract. Beginning with Winterbottom v. Wright in 1842, in which the
court found the requirement necessary in order to avoid the "most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which [it could] . . . see no
limit,"' and running through a series of gradually increasing and
widening exceptions to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' in 1916,
in which the exceptions were found to have consumed the rule, the
law has now progressed to the point at which every American juris-
diction has eliminated the privity requirement in a negligence action.!
But in these cases it still is necessary to prove negligence of the de-
fendant either in the manufacture of the product or in the failure to
discover and correct its dangerous condition.
This Article concerns strict liability-liability imposed on a manu-
facturer of a chattel because of an injury caused to plaintiff or his
property by the condition of the chattel, without regard to the
presence or absence of his negligence. This, too, is a story of the
gradual elimination of the requirement of privity. Although this de-
velopment started later and has by no means yet become unanimous,
it is now proceeding at a pace so rapid as to be almost without prece-
dent. It seems safe to predict that strict liability for products will
soon be the established law in this country. There are several de-
veloping lines.
II. BREACH OF WARRANTY
It is generally agreed that the action for breach of warranty
originally was tortious in nature, similar to deceit." With the de-
velopment of the action of assumpsit, providing a remedy for breach
. This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered at the Institute on Personal Injury
Litigation, held by the Southwestern Legal Foundation in Dallas, Texas, on November 5-6,
1964.
** A.B., LL.B., University of Mississippi; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard; Dean, Vanderbilt
University School of Law; Meyer Visiting Research Professor, Columbia University School
of Law, 1964-65.
10 M. & W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842).
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'A very unlikely exception is Mississippi, which has yet expressly to adopt the modern
rule. See Cox v. Laws, 244 Miss. 696, 145 So. 2d 703 (1962).
' See 1 Williston, Sales § 195 (rev. ed. 1948); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888).
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of contract, an express warranty came to be regarded as a part of
the contract of sale and was enforceable on that basis. Still later a
sale by description was held to be the equivalent of an express war-
ranty, being treated as a warranty implied factually from the intent
of the parties. Eventually implied warranties were imposed regard-
less of the intent of the parties-they were created by law. The two
types of implied warranty significant in this connection are the war-
ranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.
The typical case not only grew out of the contract but was actually
on the contract; it was a suit for the economic loss sustained by the
buyer because the article was not up to standard and thus was not
what he expected to purchase. The action being on the contract-to
put the party in the position he would have been in if the contract
had been carried out-privity of contract was naturally required.
But in certain factual situations other suits of a different nature also
were brought. These were the actions for physical injury, arising as
consequential damages. True, they grew out of the contract of sale,
but they were not necessarily based on that contract in the same
sense. They were more nearly analogous to the action for negligence,
which also grows out of the contract of sale but which no longer
requires privity because the obligation is imposed by the law, regard-
less of the intent of the parties.
But, even treating the cause of action as based on contract and
therefore requiring privity, many courts have permitted a warranty
action by the ultimate purchaser against the manufacturer by stretch-
ing various legal concepts out of shape in order to find privity pres-
ent. Thus, they sometimes have treated the retailer as an agent of
either the manufacturer or the purchaser;7 they have spoken of
assignment of the interest; s or they have treated the purchaser as
a third-party beneficiary of another contract.! More frequently they
have spoken of the warranty as running with the chattel, much as a
covenant runs with the land." This, while contrary to the previous
'See generally Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958
Wis. L. Rev. 219; Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L.
Rev. 117 (1943).
' Perhaps an additional analogy can be drawn to quasi-contracts, or so-called contracts
implied in law. The courts came to realize that the obligation here was imposed by the
law and did not depend upon the intent of the parties, so that privity of contract was not
required.
'See, e.g., Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929).
'E.g., Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d
445 (1936).9 E.g., Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
"°This idea first was presented in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876,
111 So. 305 (1927).
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law on the subject, is not necessarily fictitious, because a warranty
can run with the chattel if the courts change the law to make it do so.
Other courts, more forthright, have recalled that the warranty
action was originally tortious in nature, so that contractual privity
is not a necessary element of the cause of action," or have said that
public, policy demands the elimination of the privity requirement."
By one of these means or another, a considerable number of states
have eliminated or restricted the requirement of privity in an action
for physical injury which purports to be for breach of an implied
warranty.
Relaxation of the requirement of privity, if it is not complete, may
be affected by the persons or the type of product involved. Thus, in
the treatment of the persons involved, some courts found it easier
to mitigate the requirement gradually and to allow an action for
injuries to members of the family of the purchaser" or to his em-
ployees. 4 This was usually only a step toward complete elimination."
In the other side of the chain, there was no similar gradual process of
going from the retailer to the wholesaler to the manufacturer.
As for the products involved, the first cases all involved foodstuffs
and were expressly limited to them." During recent years, there has
been an expansion to include articles involving intimate bodily use
and then to include all types of products.' Some states made the
11 The best early presentation of this is to be found in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). A number of recent cases have taken this position.
"2See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Mazzetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) ("demands of social
justice"). On the various devices, see generally Gillam, Products Liability in the Automobile
Industry 58-61 (1960).
"See, e.g., Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961). And see
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 to the effect that a warranty extends to a "person who
is in the family or household" of a buyer, or "a guest in his home."
14E.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
"5 Thus, with the cases in the preceding two footnotes compare the later cases of
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963); and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), noted in 17
Sw. L.J. 699 (1963).
" The present status of the law regarding foodstuffs, with a classification of the various
juridsictions, may be found in I Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 23.01 (1964);
Prosser, Torts 674-76 (3d ed. 1964). Dean Prosser classifies 17 jurisdictions as eliminating
the requirement of privity for food and drink, and he adds 6 more as likely from general
holdings. Twelve jurisdictions have not changed from the old rule. "No new state has
rejected the strict liability as to food since 1935, and since that year sixteen have accepted
it." Id. at 676.
" This is dramatically illustrated by the experience of the American Law Institute with
the Restatement of Torts (Second). As originally submitted by the Reporter (William L.
Prosser), it contained a new section which provided for strict liability of sellers of "food
for human consumption," with a caveat for other products. Restatement (Second), Torts
§ 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). Developments had progressed so rapidly, however, that
it was decided to include also "products for intimate bodily use," and this was approved by
the Institute in 1962. See id. (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962). Two years later, however, de-
velopments had proceeded so far that the Reporter offered and the Institute approved a
new version applying to "any product." See id. (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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transition step by step, 8 while others went the whole way all at once."
In the earliest cases indicating that the no-privity rule would apply
to products generally, the opinions showed some confusion between
the action for negligence and the action for breach of warranty,20 but
since the decision in the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.," in 1960, there has been a sudden flood of cases, clearly
demonstrating a strong trend.
In the meantime another line of cases has developed, presenting an
action on what is sometimes called an express warranty. In these cases
the manufacturer has advertised to the public, making representa-
tions regarding the quality and condition of his product. When a
purchaser relies on the representation and receives physical damage
as a result of its falsity, a substantial majority of the courts have
allowed recovery.2 The representation, they say, was made directly
to the purchaser, and the retailer, if he played any part, was merely
a conduit.
III. THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AS IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY
While the law of warranty was developing in actions for physical
injury and expanding to apply in the absence of privity, at least two
developments were occurring in the law of negligence to bring it
closer to strict liability for dangerous products.
The first involved the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In theory this
concept is a consistent and integral part of the law of negligence. It
is regarded as merely a form of circumstantial evidence which permits
the jury to infer from the defective condition of the chattel that the
manufacturer must have been negligent. In practice, the opportunity
" E.g., New York, which went from Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139
N.E. 576 (1923) (no recovery in warranty without privity, even for foodstuffs), to Green-
berg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961) (recovery allowed for food for a
member of the family of the purchaser), to Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (airplane). See also, in California, Peterson v. Lamb
Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960), and Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 699 (1963).
" E.g., New Jersey. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960), the court held that privity was not required in the case of an automobile, even
though it had not previously made this holding regarding foods. See also the similar case
of General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
20This was true in both Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353
Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958), and Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 46 Ohio App. 161,
102 N.E.2d 289 (1951). See also General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, supra note 19.
as 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
1
2 Thus, in the first case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409
(1932), on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934), an automobile was ad-
vertised as having shatterproof glass. When this proved not to be true, so that a rock
striking the windshield caused a sliver of glass to put out the plaintiff's eye, he was allowed
to recover against the manufacturer. Numerous later cases had followed the holding. See
.Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962);
Restatement (Second), Torts § 402B (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
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to hold for the plaintiff has often been all that the jury needed, and
juries must have sometimes found manufacturers negligent in creating
or failing to discover a defective condition when the facts were
actually otherwise. There has been little that the defendant could do
about this development because the only evidence he could make
available was that of due care in the manufacturing process, and this
is almost never sufficient to take the case out of the hands of the
jury." Even in a negligence action, therefore, proof that the article
was defective when it left the manufacturer has often been all that
the plaintiff needed in order to obtain a verdict in his favor.'
The second involves the doctrine of negligence per se, especially
as it has been applied to the various pure-food laws. As construed by
many courts, a person who sells foods or drugs which are adulterated
or impure is negligent per se and is liable for injury caused from the
food without any need of proving his knowledge of the impure con-
dition, his negligence in creating it or his failure to discover it."
Although these holdings use the language of negligence, their effect
is to impose strict liability."
IV. EXPRESS RECOGNITION OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
Within the past few years there has evolved a recognition that the
liability here being imposed is a form of strict liability, directly in
tort. This new development is distinct from the opinions pointing
out that the personal-injury action for breach of implied warranty is
based on the tort aspect of the warranty action." Here the warranty
language is disregarded as superfluous, and the liability is forth-
rightly recognized as tortious in nature and strict in character be-
cause it does not require proof of defendant's negligence.
The leading case is Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,28 ren-
23 Cases on proof of negligence in products liability have been treated in Dean Page
Keenton's paper in this Symposium. See Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining To
Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. - (1965), and his earlier article, Products Liability-
Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 Va. L. Rev. 675 (1963).
24 See discussion in Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer §5 2.9-2.18
(1951); 1 Frumer & Friedman, op. cit. supra note 16, 5 12.03, especially 5 12.03 [8].
And see generally Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault (1951); Leflar, Negligence in Name
Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564 (1952).
55 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938);
Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939) (statute uses language
of warranty); McKenzie v. Peoples Baking Co., 205 S.C. 149, 31 S.E.2d 154 (1944).
" See Dickerson, op. cit. supra note 24, 55 1.24, 2.19.
"TE.g., Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 865 (1963) (cigarettes); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile); Jacob E. Dexter & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164
S.W.2d 828 (1942) (food).
28 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 669 (1963). The opinion
was by Judge Roger J. Traynor, and it is presaged by his famous concurring opinion in
Escola v. Coca-C6s1a Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 461, Iso P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
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dered in California in 1963. As the court said in that case, after
citing a number of other cases:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufac-
turer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a con-
tract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed
by agreement but imposed by law . . . and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective
products . . . make clear that the liability is not one governed by the
law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."
This holding was followed by the same court and the application
broadened to apply to a retailer in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co."°
The New York Court in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., '
although treating the action as being one for breach of an implied
warranty of fitness and saying that such an action sounds in tort,
cited the Greenman case with approval and stated that its charac-
terization of "strict tort liability" is "surely a more accurate phrase.""2
The Missouri court has cited Greenman with approval under similar
circumstances,"3 and the Nevada court, although holding that an
action for breach of warranty will not lie without privity, expressly
left open the question as to whether an action for strict liability in
tort might be maintained. "
Strict liability in tort is the explanation which has been adopted
in the Restatement of Torts (Second). Section 402A provides that
the seller is "subject to liability" even though he has "used all possible
care,"" and comment m expressly states that the language of war-
29 5 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
3037 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
3112 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
3' 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83.
33 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
"4 Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963). See also Kyker
v. General Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964).
5 The whole section reads as follows:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller. Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
The words in italics, though not to be found in Tentative Draft Number 10, have subse-
quently been added, and will appear in the permanent edition, to be published soon.
[Vol. 19:5
STRICT TORT LIABILITY
ranty is both superfluous and likely to prove misleading. The Re-
porter, Dean Prosser, has elaborated on this in a recent article' and
in the latest edition of his treatise.37
The combination of the California and New York opinions, the
new Restatement provisions and the Prosser writings is likely to prove
very influential in the immediate future, and the strict-liability ex-
planation may soon supplant the warranty explanation.
After all, as the New York court says, it is "more accurate," and
as the Restatement says, it is "much simpler." It eliminates com-
pletely the whole problem of the requirement of privity of contract.
Neither the Uniform Commercial Code nor the Uniform Sales Act
will be applicable, with their definitions of buyer and seller, pro-
visions as to the scope of warranty and requirements of notice of
breach. Contractual aspects of disclaimer and rescission are avoided.
Reliance on a warranty or on the seller's abilities need not be proved,
and no express representation is required. There is no problem about
maintaining a death action, and it seems likely that questions of con-
flict of laws can be more easily solved. 8 From every standpoint it
seems far more desirable to eschew the language of warranty and to
speak of strict liability in tort. As a famous quotation puts it, "The
remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon
the intricacies of the law of sales." 3
V. EXTENT OF ADOPTION
A little over sixty years ago, the Supreme Court of Washington
decided the first case imposing strict liability for foodstuffs, despite
the absence of privity." Since that time cases have gradually aug-
mented the list until seventeen states are now listed as expressly hold-
ing that a manufacturer of foodstuffs is strictly liable to the con-
sumer."' In five others there are holdings in regard to other articles
which will probably apply to foods. Three impose strict liability
through a per-se interpretation of pure-food statutes, and four others
have statutes expressly imposing strict liability. This makes a total of
" Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1960).
'7 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16, S 97.
" See, generally Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A, comment m (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1964); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16, 678-81.
" First stated in Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), and
often quoted since then.
'°Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
"' The listing is by Dean Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16, at 675.
1965 ]
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twenty-nine. Still adhering to the old rule are twelve states, leaving
nine states uncommitted. 2
It has been only a half-dozen years since the first decision was ren-
dered applying strict liability to articles other than food products."3
Already there are holdings or other indications in about half of the
states that strict liability will extend beyond food products." A move-
ment this rapid is almost completely unprecedented and is indicative
of a strong trend amounting to a groundswell. When this develop-
ment is combined with the authority of the Restatement and of the
numerous writers in the field," the future state of the law becomes
quite clear.
4 Id. at 674-76. See also Dickerson, op. cit. supsra note 24, §§ 2.1-2.5; 1 Frumer &
Friedman, op. cit. supra note 16, § 23.01.
" The case is Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). Several years earlier, an intermediate court in Ohio had so held
in Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 46 Ohio App. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (1951), but the
case was subsequently overruled by the supreme court in Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159
Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953). But cf. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958), which may have restored it.
'For a nonexhaustive list, see the following: California: Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (power tool); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37
Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964) (automobile); Connecticut: Connolly v. Hagi, 24
Conn. Super. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963) (automobile); District of Columbia: Picker
X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (Munic. App. D.C. 1962) (auto-
mobile); Florida: Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104
So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958) (electric cable); Green v. Amercian Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d
169 (Fla. 1963) (cigarettes); Illinois: Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318,
201 N.E.2d 313 (1964) (car brakes); Iowa: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-
Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) (automobile); Kansas: Graham v.
Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair dye); Michigan: Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958)
(cinder blocks); Minnesota: Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959)
(dictum-any product); Missouri: Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41
(Mo. 1963) (gas range); New Jersey: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile); New York: Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (airplane); Ohio: Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) (hair preparation); Pennsylvania:
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (automobile); but cf.
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Tennessee: General
Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) (automobile); but
cf. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964); Washington: Esborg v.
Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963) (hair dye).
In addition to these 16, jurisdictions, there are six others in which federal courts have
indicated that strict liability will be applied. Hawaii: Brown v. Chapman, 198 F. Supp. 78
(D. Hawaii 1961), aft'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt); Indiana: cf. Hart v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (tire); Louisiana: Lar-
tigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 865
(1963) (cigarettes); Oregon: Spada v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 819 (D. Ore.
1961) (weed killer); Texas: Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964)
(wheelchair), noted in this same issue, 19 Sw. L.J. - (1965); Siegel v. Braniff Airways,
Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (airplane); Vermont: Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (water heater).
: Finally, the states of Georgia, Virginia and Wyoming have statutes imposing strict
liability. Ga. Code Ann. § 96-307 (1958); Va. Code Ann. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. S 34-2-218 (Supp. 1963).
4 See, e.g., Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne L. Rev.
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The strict liability for the so-called express warranty, which began
with a holding of the Supreme Court of Washington in 1932,' has
now been accepted in some twenty jurisdictions, and there have been
no contrary decisions since 1938."7 It has been adopted in the Restate-
ment of Torts4 (without the warranty terminology) and now seems
clearly established.
VI. NATURE OF STRICT LIABILITY
What do we mean when we speak of strict liability of a manu-
facturer for harm caused by his products? Is it sufficient for a plain-
tiff to show that he used the defendant's product and that he was
injured? The answer to this is no. If the plaintiff's theory is breach
of warranty, he must prove the breach-i.e., that the article was not
merchantable or was not fit for the purpose sold. If the theory is
strict liability in tort, the plaintiff must still prove that the article
was unsafe in some way. Thus, the liability is not that of an insurer;
it is not absolute in the literal sense of that word.
On the other hand, it is strict in the same sense that there is no
need to prove that the manufacturer was negligent. If the article left
the defendant's control in a dangerously unsafe condition (or if it
failed to comply with the implied warranty), the defendant is liable
whether or not he was at fault in creating that condition or in failing
to discover and eliminate it.
1 (1963); James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923 (1957); James, Products Liability, 34 Texas L. Rev. 192 (1955);
Keeton, Products Liability-Liability without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41
Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 Texas
L. Rev. 193 (1961); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road
to and Past Vandermark., 38 So. Cal. L. Rev. 30 (1065); Noel, Strict Liability of Manu-
facturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward
Strict Liability, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 963 (1957); Patterson, Manufacturer's Statutory War-
ranty: Tort or Contract?, 10 Mercer L. Rev. 272 (1959); Prosser, The Assault upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1959).
4 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), on second appeal, 179
Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
47 For cases, see Restatement (Second), Torts § 402B, at 40-43 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1961); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16, at 684-85.
4SRestatement (Second), Torts § 402B (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). The section reads
as follows:
§ 402B. Misrepresentation by Seller of Chattels to Consumer
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels
or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact con-
cerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability
for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
The portion in italics, though not to be found in Tentative Draft Number 6, has been
added subsequently, and will appear in the permanent edition, to be published soon.
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In essence, strict liability in this sense is not different from negli-
gence per se. Selling a dangerously unsafe product is the equivalent
of negligence regardless of the defendant's conduct in letting it be-
come unsafe. This is exactly the situation when a pure-food status
is construed to make its violation negligence per se; if the food is not
wholesome, the statute is violated and the defendant is negligent.'9
It has long been recognized that although the normal test for negli-
gence is the general standard of what a reasonable man would do
under similar circumstances and, although this test is ordinarily
applied by the jury, the courts on appropriate occasions may lay down
specific rules of conduct. They do this when they accept a criminal
statute as setting forth a specific rule and then adopt that rule for
a civil case." But they also do it from time to time even in the absence
of a statute. 1 Thus, a court which appears to be taking the radical
step of changing from negligence to strict liability for products is
really doing nothing more than adopting a rule that selling a danger-
ously unsafe chattel is negligence within itself."2
Section 402A of the Restatement sets forth two requirements for
liability-that the product be "in a defective condition" and that it
be "unreasonably dangerous." The requirement of a defective con-
dition is easily understandable in the usual situation in which a par-
ticular article has something wrong with it. Because of a mistake in
the manufacturing process, for example, the product was adulterated
or one of its parts was broken or weakened or not properly attached,
and it did not function as expected. If this occurs, there is no need
of proving fault in letting it come to be in that condition. But a
defect may be only a minor one, and the Restatement indicates that
strict liability is not to be imposed unless it makes the product un-
reasonably dangerous.
The more difficult problem arises with a product which was made
in the way it was intended to be made and in the condition planned
and which yet proves to be dangerous. Is such an article defective?
49 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938);
McKenzie v. Peoples Baking Co., 205 S.C. 149, 31 S.E.2d 154 (1944); cf. Merck & Co. v.
Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
"°See Restatement (Second), Torts § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959); Prosser, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 193; Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
Colum. L. Rev. 21 (1949).
" See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 17.2 (1956); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 16, § 37;
James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conducts in Negligence Trials, 5 Vand. L.
Rev. 697 (1952).
" In a sense this is also similar to applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and saying
that selling a dangerously unsafe product gives rise to the inference that there was negligence
in letting it become unsafe or in failing to discover its condition. But there it is necessary
for the jury to find negligence.
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Perhaps it can be said to be improperly designed, and the bad design
may be called a defect. But then the design is "defective" only be-
cause it made the product unreasonably dangerous. Or what of a
product to which a certain number of people are allergic. Is it de-
fective? This too depends upon whether it is unreasonably dangerous.
In cases of this general type the phrase "defective condition" has no
independent meaning, and the attempt to use it is apt to prove
misleading." The only real problem is whether the product is "un-
reasonably dangerous," because "defective condition," if it is to be
applied at all, depends on that. Strict liability is appropriate for these
cases, and it would be better in them not to refer to any requirement
of defectiveness. As a matter of fact, even in the first type of cases
in which the article was defective because of something that went
wrong in the manufacturing process, the true problem in the end is
whether that defect makes the product unreasonably dangerous.
Thus, the test for imposing strict liability is whether the product
was unreasonably dangerous, to use the words of the Restatement.
Somewhat preferable is the expression, "not reasonably safe."" It has
been suggested that this amounts to characterizing the product rather
than the defendant's conduct."5 This is quite true, but it is easy to
phrase the issue in terms of conduct. Thus, assuming that the de-
fendant had knowledge of the condition of the product, would he
then have been acting unreasonably in placing it on the market?
This, it would seem, is another way of posing the question of whether
the product is reasonably safe or not. And it may well be the most
useful way of presenting it.
It may be argued that this is simply a test of negligence. Exactly.
In strict liability, except for the element of defendant's scienter, the
test is the same as that for negligence. Take Greenman v. Yuba Power
53 It 'is, of course, perfectly possible to give the term a special legal meaning which
would apply to this type of situation, but it seems pointless to attempt to do this when
the second phrase covers the whole idea. In Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App.
2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963), the question was whether adequate warn-
ing was given that a "surface preparer" gave off inflammable fumes. After quoting the
Greenman case with its reference to defects, the court said: "While there was no 'defect'
in the surface preparer manufactured by Universal, it contained latent dangerous char-
acteristics against which it was incumbent to protect during handling and use, with
respect to which appropriate warning must be given the public." 32 Cal. Rptr. at 757. It
held strict liability applicable.
14 "Unreasonably dangerous" carries an overtone of "ultrahazardous" and that type of
strict tort liability. "Not reasonably safe" is closer to the language normally used in breach-
of-warranty cases: "reasonably fit for the purpose for which sold," "wholesome." See the
expression in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo. 1963): "fit
and reasonably safe for use by the 'consumer' when used in the manner and for the purpose
for which they are manufactured and sold .... "




Prods., Inc.," the famous California case, for example. If the de-
fendant manufacturer knew that the design of the machine (a power
tool, called a "Shopsmith") was such that inadequate set screws would
sometimes allow the tailstock of the lathe to move away from the
piece of wood and thus cause the piece to fly out of the machine, it
would clearly be liable in negligence in putting the machine on the
market. (Indeed, the defendant was almost certainly negligent for
failing to discover this.) The court held in the case that strict lia-
bility might be imposed because of a "defect in design and manu-
facture . . . that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.""
This is by no means an indication that the machine must be made
perfectly safe or foolproof, but instead is a holding that this product
was not reasonably safe.
Strict products liability clearly does not require a perfectly safe
product. 8 A simple instrument like a hammer, for example, will not
infrequently smash a finger or thumb if used unskillfully. It could
probably be designed to make this possibility less likely, but at the
cost of impairing its usefulness. Despite the dangers which the hammer
creates, it is treated as reasonably safe. Or consider an automobile.
It occasionally may be involved in an accident in which there is no
fault on the part of anyone. It is designed, for example, to go so fast
that if an obstacle suddenly and unexpectedly looms in front of it,
the driver will be unable to stop or swerve in time to avoid a collision.
Yet the manufacturer is not held liable if this happens. Nor is the
manufacturer of an airplane automatically held liable if the plane
crashes. Take an object for internal human consumption-e.g.,
aspirin, which may occasionally cause serious internal bleeding or
produce other complications, or penicillin, to which the reactions of
559 Cal. 2d 57, 377 F.2d 897 (1963), noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 669 (1963).
'7 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901. In Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d
102 (2d Cir. 1954), a baby bathinette was made of a magnesium alloy, which would burn
when over 1,0500 F.; the court treated the problem of liability in negligence and for
breach of warranty as the same, and held that the product was reasonably fit for normal
uise.
Us ,It must be remembered that the implied warranty of merchantability means that
the article is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is sold. Absolute perfection is
not implied." Francis, J., in Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 534, 182
A.2d 545, 554 (1962). "Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard
to negligence, 'does not mean that goods are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of
producing injury . . . . By and large, the standard of safety of the goods is the same under
the warranty theory as under the negligence theory.' " Wisdom, J., in Lartigue v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir. 1963), quoting from 2 Harper & James,
op. cit. supra note 51, at 1584. See also Dickerson, supra note 55, at 594-95; Keeton, Products
Liability-Liability without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855
(1963); Lascher, supra note 45, at 46-48; Prosser, supra note 45, at 1145-46.
The same rule applies to the retailer's liability. See, e.g., Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788, 793 (1943) ("a warranty does not constitute an agreement
that the goods can be used with absolute safety or are prefectly adapted to the intended
use but only that they shall reasonably fit therefor").
[Vol. 19: 5
STRICT TORT LIABILITY
some persons are quite drastic. Yet there is no contention that the
manufacturer should be held to an insurer's liability.
What goes into a consideration of whether a product is reasonably
safe or not? This is a standard, as distinguished from a precise rule,
and it affords flexibility and individualization of determination. If
the test is equivalent to that of whether a reasonable prudent man
would put it on the market if he knew of the dangers of this par-
ticular article, then the elements for determining negligence are
relevant. We have here again the problem of balancing the utility of
the risk against the magnitude of the risk. " Factors involved in
making this determination include, among others, the following: (1)
the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of
other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood
of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the
danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of
the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoida-
bility of injury by care in use of the product (including the effect
of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability to eliminate the
danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or
making it unduly expensive."
Who makes the determination as to whether a product is reasonably
safe? In many cases there will be a factual dispute as to the actual
condition of the article, and this of course will normally go to the
jury. But putting this situation aside, who decides whether the estab-
lished condition was reasonably safe or not? There is little treatment
of this. By analogy to negligence, we would say that the jury applies
the standard unless it is so clear that only a single result could reason-
ably be reached. Yet in the field of strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities---or abnormally dangerous activities, as the new Restate-
ment now characterizes them-the determination as to whether the
activity is one for which strict liability is to be imposed is normally
made by the court."1 This last principle may be complied with by
59 See Restatement, Torts §§ 291-93 (1934); Prosser, Torts § 31 (3d ed. 1964).
o The suggestion has been made that the best single test is that of the reasonable expec-
tations of the buying public. See Dickerson, supra note 55 at 593. And see Betehia v. Cape
Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
9 Whether the conduct of the defendant has been that of a reasonable man
of ordinary prudence, or in the alternative has been negligent, is ordinarily
an issue to be left to the jury. . . . The imposition of strict liability, on the
other hand, involves a characterization of the defendant's activity or enter-
prise itself, and a decision as to whether he is free to conduct it at all without
being liable for the harm which ensues even though he has used all reason-
able care. This calls for a decision of the court; and it is no part of the
province of the jury to decide whether an industrial enterprise upon which
the community's prosperity might depend is located in the wrong place. . ..
Restatement (Second), Torts § 520, comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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saying that the court makes the determination that strict liability
will be applied to products in general and that the jury makes the
determination as to whether it will be applied to the kind of product
involved. It would seem likely, however, that the court's function
will prove to be somewhat broader and that it will sometimes make
the determination for the kind of product-e.g., hammers, auto-
mobiles, aspirin-and leave to the jury the question of whether the
particular article involved was reasonably safe. This would appear
not to be inconsistent with the usual practice regarding the relative
functions of judge and jury in actions for breach of warranty.
Certain types of situations have given rise to considerable difficulty
in the past. A few comments on some of them may be helpful. Take
first the cases involving allergies. Courts have often said that there
is no breach of warranty if the product is safe to the normal con-
sumer." This gives the misleading impression that a person is unable
to recover if his injury comes about through his allergy to the
product. The true issue in these allergy cases is no different from that
involving other products. Is the product reasonably safe? It is not if
a significant proportion of the consumers are allergic to it or an
element in it. What proportion? That question is not answered in
advance when a standard is applied. Some of the factors affecting it
are (1) the kind of product and the public need for it, (2) the feasi-
bility of eliminating the allergen, (3) the seriousness of the reaction
which it may produce, (4) the public's knowledge as to the likeli-
hood of allergic reactions and (5) the feasibility and usefulness of a
warning." There is no need to prove negligence on the part of the
manufacturer in failing to ascertain whether the product would pro-
duce an allergic reaction on the part of a portion of the public;
instead, it need be shown only that there was negligence in selling the
product in its present condition, assuming that the manufacturer
knew of its propensity.
Another group of cases involves trichinae-infested pork. As in the
other food cases involving strict liability, the courts have generally
used warranty terminology and have often spoken of the requirement
of wholesomeness or fitness for human consumption. The true issue
62 See, e.g., Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946);
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955). At the other extreme,
some courts have been ready to hold that the defendant warrants that the consumer will
not be injured by the product, even though it would be safe to everyone else. See Zampino
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 10 Misc. 2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1958), rev'd, s
App. Div. 2d 304, 187 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1959).
"aSee, in general, Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d
513 (1960); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963). And see
Noel, Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 331 (1959).
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is whether the trichinous pork is reasonably safe in the light of the
common practice of cooking it and the common knowledge of the
danger of trichinosis from uncooked pork. Putting the problem in
these terms eliminates extraneous issues which complicate the de-
cision in many cases."
The cigarette cases have caused considerable disagreement. Are
cigarettes reasonably safe for human consumption? Two courts have
held that this determination must be made in the light of human
knowledge available at the time of manufacture."5 Two others have
taken the position that in strict liability the state of either the de-
fendant's own knowledge or of human knowledge generally is not
relevant; the question is whether the product itself was reasonably
safe."6 The last two cases seem more logically consistent with the basis
of strict liability. It is significant that in later trials following these
two cases the juries held for the defendant. 7 Today, when the tobacco
companies do have knowledge of the possibility of contracting cancer
from the use of cigarettes, it is still unlikely that they will be held
liable for selling cigarettes. There is no present way of eliminating
this propensity, and people who want to smoke want to do it badly
enough to buy the cigarettes regardless of the danger. Similarly, one
who buys whiskey and becomes an alcoholic or develops cirrhosis of
the liver probably has no action against the manufacturer."' If a
64See, e.g., Silverman v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 A.2d 277 (1954); Adams v.
Scheib, 408 Pa. 452, 184 A.2d 700 (1962). For a good treatment, see Dickerson, Products
Liability and the Food Consumer §§ 4.4-4.21 (1951).
'5 Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
66 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
67 Of particular significance is the result in the Florida case. In answer to a question
certified to it by the Fifth Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court had held that the warranty
of merchantable quality-"of a product's reasonable fitness for human use or consumption"
-would apply even though the individual could not discover the unsafe condition by exer-
cise of due care, and even though the state of human knowledge at the time did not dis-
close its condition. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). The Fifth
Circuit then held that it was for the jury to determine whether the cigarettes were "'rea-
sonably fit and wholesome,' " since there was no requirement that they be " 'foolproof or
incapable of producing injury.'" Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 677 (5th
Cir. 1963). The case was then tried in the federal district court in Florida, with the judge
instructing that the jury were to determine whether cigarettes are reasonably fit for human
consumption, and that if they "impose a threat to any substantial number of people who
use them, then they would not be reasonably fit," but that the warranty "does not impose
upon the defendant the duty to make an absolutely safe product." The jury returned a ver-
dict for the defendant. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1964, pp. 1, 43; id., Nov. 30, 1964, pp.
1, 15; 8 Personal Injury Newsletter 121 (Dec. 14, 1964).
68 "Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics. . . . Good tobacco is not unreasonably
dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful .. " Restatement (Sec-
ond), Torts § 402A, comment i (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). Compare the remarks of
Goodrich, J., concurring, in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 302
(3d Cir. 1961). And see Keeton, Products Liability-Current Developments, 40 Texas L.
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dangerous characteristic cannot be eliminated, a product still may
sometimes be sufficiently desirable to make its sale proper and not
the basis for liability."'
Another group of cases involves the use of blood plasma. Under the
current state of scientific knowledge, the presence of the hepatitis
virus cannot be discovered, and there is no way to process the plasma
to eliminate it. Thinking that to apply strict liability to this type of
siuation would require holding the defendant liable, several courts
have resorted to the expedient of holding that the supplying of the
plasma is a service, not a sale, so that no warranty should apply."°
These courts are wrong on both counts."5 It would be far simpler and
less damaging to the state of the law to hold the blood plasma reason-
ably safe when the virus is unlikely to be present and impossible to
eliminate, and the need for the plasma is great. This could well be
pronounced in these cases as a matter of law."
It is necessary, of course, that the plaintiff show not only that the
product was unsafe but also that the defendant was responsible for
its condition. This is not a requirement that the defendant be at fault
in this regard; if that were true he would be liable for negligence.
The issue is usually whether the article was in an unsafe condition
when it left the defendant's control. This usually gives rise to a
Rev. 193 (1961). "Even if it be assumed that tobacco causes cancer in a small percentage
of users, it can hardly be said that the tobacco has a defect in it, because the utility of
tobacco is such that reasonable men would continue to manufacture and sell it even with
this knowledge." Id. at 210.
" See Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A, comment k (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)
"(Unavoidably Unsafe Products)." The example is cited there of "the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and even permanently injurious con-
sequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably results in a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the un-
avoidably high degree of risk which they involve."70 E.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954)
("If . . . the court were to stamp as a sale the supplying of blood . . . it would mean that
the hospital, no matter how careful, no matter that the disease-producing potential in the
blood could not possibly be discovered, would be held responsible, virtually as an insurer, if
anything were to happen to the patient as a result of 'bad' blood"); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1961) (hospitals
"should not be strapped with an insurability of blood purity, absent negligence"). See also
Merck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
" On the sales-service dichotomy and the presence of warranties, see Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957); Note, 2 Vand.
L. Rev. 675 (1949).72 Compare Fischer v. Wilmington General Hosp., 149 A.2d 749 (Del. Super. 1959).
"[T]he risk of transferring the hepatitis virus is almost an insignificant risk in comparison
of [sic] the risk of shock if transfusion is needed and not given. In effect, the ordering of
a transfusion in a case such as was here involved is considered to be a calculated risk." Id.
at 752. This was apparently a negligence action, but the alleged negligence was not in failing
to discover the presence of the virus but in using the plasma with knowledge of the possible
presence. The problem here is not significantly different in the strict liability cases. The
court also held that there was no negligence in failing to warn the plaintiff of the risk since
the transfusion was needed and the warning would only add worry.
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dispute of fact, and the plaintiff will often have resort to circumstan-
tial evidence to supply his proof."3 If he sues the retailer, plaintiff
will not run into the problem of proving when the dangerous con-
dition arose, leaving that problem to be determined among the sev-
eral sellers.
VII. SOME PROBLEMS
There is opportunity only for a cursory glance at some problems
in connection with the application of strict liability.
A. Parties
What defendants are liable? If strict liability is to be imposed, it
will clearly apply to the manufacturer of the finished product.
Although the New York court indicated that it was not yet ready to
extend liability to the manufacturer of a component part74 and the
Restatement has caveated this problem, there is no real reason to
doubt that the liability will eventually be extended to him. The
Restatement section also imposes strict liability upon the retailer7"
and wholesaler." The Restatement limits liability to defendants who
are "engaged in the business of selling such a product."77
Parties plaintiff? The cases have gone beyond the purchaser and
members of the family or his employees to any user. As yet they have
not gone beyond a "consumer" or "user" of the product, unless a
passenger in an automobile is not to be so characterized."8 This being
tort liability, it may well extend in the future to the foreseeable
bystander."'
B. Plaintiff's Fault
The cases appear to be in disagreement as to whether contributory
negligence of the plaintiff bars his recovery in an action for strict
" This is similar to res ipsa loquitur but different because that doctrine involves the use
of circumstantial evidence to prove negligence on the part of the defendant.
" Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963). See
also Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" Most of the retailer actions have been warranty actions, treated as such. But there are
cases imposing tort liability for warranty, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), and strict tort liability without the warranty terminology,
e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
7' The cases are about evenly divided on the wholesaler's liability, and there is no logical
reason for treating him differently. For citations, see Prosser, op. cit. supra note 59, at 682
n.45.
7 Note that this limitation applies only to strict liability. Liability in negligence may
still be applicable to a person not in the business.
7 See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964),
where a passenger recovered.
7' This is left to a caveat in the Restatement. See Note, Strict Products Liability and the
Bystander, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 916 (1964),
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products liability. In general, however, they can be reconciled by
adverting to the customary distinction between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. If the plaintiff's negligence was in
failing to discover the unsafe condition of the product he can usually
recover; if his negligence was in continuing to use the product after
learning of the danger condition, his recovery is usually barred. 0
C. Disclaimers Or Warnings
Unless a court is confused by warranty terminology into treating
the action as one in contract, a disclaimer (or limitation of liability)
will not automatically bar recovery. A disclaimer does not bar a tort
action. On the other hand, one can consent to what would otherwise
be a tort, and an actual agreement that the defendant will not be
liable for his tort will be controlling as between the parties to the
contract unless it is held to be against public policy and void.81 So
also with a warning. A second-hand chattel, for example, sold on an
as-is basis or with an express warning of a defective condition may
well not give rise to a cause of action in strict liability in the immedi-
ate buyer. A statement of the ingredients of a particular product to
bring it to the attention of an allergic user or instructions for the
use of a dangerous chattel may make it reasonably safe. But in all of
these situations, a difficult problem can still arise when the chattel
comes into the hands of a subsequent purchaser who uses it without
any knowledge of the agreement or the warning or the instructions.
Two issues may be raised: (1) Was the defendant negligent toward
the plaintiff in failing to take proper action to see that the warning
or the instructions would come to the attention of the subsequent
purchaser, and (2) can the defendant "shift the responsibility" to
the first purchaser? These situations necessarily presume knowledge
on the part of the first purchaser of the dangerous condition of the
chattel, and holdings in negligence cases are entirely relevant."
D. Causation
A plaintiff must prove that the dangerous condition of the product
was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury. This is cause-
in-fact, which is normally for the jury to determine. There must also
be legal, or proximate, cause. Is the ambit of liability here essentially
the same as in a negligence action, or is it broader or more narrow?
In the case of strict liability for extrahazardous or abnormally dan-
8 For discussion and citation of cases, see Prosser, op. cit. supra note 59, at 656-57. See
also 1 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16.01 [3] (1964).
81 See the general discussion in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
81 See Prosser, op. cit. snpra note 59, at 670-71.
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gerous activities, it is generally agreed that the extent of liability is
somewhat narrower than in negligence cases."s So also would it appear
to be in strict liability for products. The warranty cases speak of
fitness for the purpose for which sold,"* and in the leading case ex-
pressly recognizing strict liability in tort, the court spoke of the
product being "unsafe for its intended use.""3 In Hardman v. Helene
Curtis Indus., Inc., the court held that the "essential question pre-
sented by a claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability
is whether the product failed to safely and adequately satisfy the uses
to which such products are ordinarily put."'" It seems to have regarded
this as different from the test of foreseeability in negligence cases,
though it treated those cases as analogous in indicating that the ques-
tion was one of fact for the jury." Liability for fault, it should be
remembered, is still available to the plaintiff if he can prove negli-
gence, and the basis for determining negligence may create a wider
scope of liability in that action.
E. Unfinished Products
A manufacturer may produce goods which are not in a finished
condition and will require further processing before they are ready
to reach the hands of the ultimate consumer. If, in the unfinished
condition, the goods were unsafe and the person to whom he delivered
them failed to make them safe, is the defendant liable? This question
83 See Prosser, op. cit. supra note 59, § 78; Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate
Cause, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 (1932).
84See, e.g., Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294, 297 (1961) ("reasonably
fit for the purpose intended"); Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151
N.E.2d 263, 265 (1958) (" 'reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses for which goods of
that kind and description are sold' "); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41,
55 (Mo. 1963) ("fit and reasonably safe for use by the 'consumer' when used in the manner
and for the purpose for which they are manufactured and sold"); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 76 (1960) ("reasonably fit for the general
purpose for which it is manufactured and sold").
:'Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
The complete statement reads: "To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient
that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was intended
to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not
aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use." Ibid.
"648 Ill. App. 2d 42, 63, 198 N.E.2d 681, 691 (1964).
7 "[T]he question of what is an ordinary use is as much a question of fact as is the
question of what is a foreseeable use." Ibid. In the case, a little girl had put her hair spray on
the upper part of her dress because she liked the smell, and thedress had become ignited
from a candle. A jury verdict for plaintiff was upheld.
Compare Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), afl'd, 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962), involving a hula skirt which ignited. An instruction had been given'that
the warranty was that the skirt "is reasonably fit and safe for the ordinary uses and purposes
for which it is designed and sold, or for any purpose the seller might reasonably anticipate
it will be used." Id. at 94 n.28. The court conceded that the last phrase might be too broad
as a general proposition, but found it not to constitute substantial prejudice under the facts.
Compare also Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 452 (3d Cir. 1946), in which a
descriptive warranty was held not applicable when the wire rope was used "for a purpose for
which it was not manufactured."
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was left as a caveat in the Restatement and was the subject of con-
siderable debate at the May, 1964, meeting of the American Law
Institute.
There are two significant decisions. In Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co.," a dealer apparently failed properly to complete the final steps
of processing a new Ford for delivery to a customer, with the result
that the brakes were defective. It was held that the manufacturer
could not "delegate its duty to have its cars delivered to the ultimate
purchaser free from dangerous defects," and could not "escape lia-
bility on the ground that the defect ...may have been caused by
something one of its authorized dealers did or failed to do." 9 In
Schneider v. Suhrmann,"° a supplier of pork informed the retailer that
it could no longer supply processed pork, and the retailer asked him
to continue shipments, of raw pork, which the retailer would properly
process. The supplier was held not liable to a buyer who contracted
trichinosis. The cases indicate some of the problems involved. Is the
original manufacturer identified in the customer's mind with the
finished product? Is the processer a responsible person to whom the
risk can be properly shifted?91
F. Indemnity
A manufacturer who produces an article which is not reasonably
safe should be liable not only in strict liability to the ultimate con-
sumer who is injured by it, but also in indemnity to the retailer (or
intermediate supplier) who has paid the consumer.9 Abrogation of
the privity requirement should enure also to the benefit of the re-
tailer. And it should make no difference whether the retailer was
liable to the consumer in strict liability or negligence so long as the
negligence consisted only of failing to discover the dangerous condi-
tion of the chattel. 3 A consumer, if he sued the retailer, would not
have to show when the defective condition arose; the retailer would
have to show that the manufacturer was responsible for it."
On the other hand, a manufacturer may himself be entitled to
indemnity against the maker of a component part or against a final
processor who failed to meet his responsibility for making the chattel
safe."
8s 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
"9391 P.2d at 171.
9"8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958).
91 On this second issue, see Restatement (Second), Torts § 452 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1962).
"See, e.g., Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
93 See, e.g., Boston Woven-Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657
(1901).
" C. Heath v.- Channel Lumber Co., 25 N.J. Super. 6, 95 A.2d 425 (1953).




Since the first modern decision almost 130 years ago," the law of
products liability has been in a process of continuous change. The end
is not yet. The trend for the future is clear.
The manufacturer's liability for negligence will remain, with no
difficulties about the absence of privity. His responsibility in strict
liability, already recognized in a majority of the states regarding food
products, is extending now beyond products for intimate bodily use
to products in general. It will soon become the established rule in
the United States that the manufacturer is subject to strict tort lia-
bility without regard to the requirement of privity. Some courts will
continue to speak the language of warranty, but they will usually
recognize that the liability sounds in tort, and they will seldom be
misled into applying contractual restrictions. Gradually a majority of
the courts will slough off the warranty language and will be ready
to follow the lead of the Restatement and the California court in
frankly and accurately describing the liability as strict tort liability.
But this liability, though strict, will not be that of an insurer. The
manufacturer will be liable on this basis only if he puts on the market
a product which is not reasonably safe and the plaintiff is injured as
a result of a contemplated use of it.
Plaintiffs will frequently bring a cause of action against a manu-
facturer seeking to recover on either a negligence basis or a strict-
liability basis. The essential difference between the two is that in the
latter the plaintiff will not need to prove either that the defendant
negligently created the unsafe condition of the product or that he
was aware of it. And the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has
the effect of minimizing this difference."
example, it seems likely that the manufacturer would be able to recover against the dealer
if its claims were true.
55 Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837). Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), came five years later.
9 The case of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 33 U.S.L. Week 2446 (N.J. Feb. 17,
1965), decided sometime after this'Article was finished, and not yet published at the time
of galleyproof, is of such significance as to require a final note. First, it commits New
Jersey to the theory of strict liability in tort as the "sound solution." Second, it indicates
that this liability will apply to damage to property caused by a dangerous condition of
the product. These two developments were easily predictable. But, in addition, it holds
that an action for "loss of bargain" can be maintained directly against the manufacturer
despite the absence of privity, when the article (carpeting, here) was not up to the
standard required by the implied warranty of fitness or merchantability, "even though
plaintiff's damage is limited to loss of value" of the product. Judge Francis, who wrote
the opinions in Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962),
and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), makes this
drastic change consciously and deliberately. Does it portend another step toward "'an
enterprise liability . . . not depend[ent] upon the intricacies of the law of sales," to be
taken by "courts mindful that the public interest demands consumer protection" (language
of the opinion)? What will be its relationship to the Uniform Commercial Code?
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